Constraining alternatives to computational functionalism

Some philosophical positions claim to challenge or contradict computational functionalism while remaining grounded in conventional physics and rejecting the need for any additional ingredients to explain consciousness. This project aims to refine and extend an argument challenging these positions into a form suitable for a publishable paper.

Intuitively speaking, the core idea behind the argument is simply to point out that conventional physics is compatible with the simulation hypothesis, and that if the universe were in fact a simulation then computational functionalism would be true. Any theory or evidence which is grounded in conventional physics therefore cannot challenge or contradict computational functionalism. It may be possible to use this argument to challenge high-profile theories and positions such as IIT (which claims not to be a computational functionalist theory) and the idea that consciousness could be dependent on e.g. biological substrate. A more rigorous formulation of the argument can be found here.

I developed the argument during the previous round of Sentient Futures under Chris Percy's mentorship. An informal version of the argument is now included here on his cf-debate website. I'm currently working towards developing the idea further into a publishable paper with continued high-level input from Chris. This project would involve collaborating with me in this endeavour, including helping with reviewing the relevant literature to pin down the key positions which are vulnerable to this argument, refining the argument to handle additional nuances that come up and co-authoring the paper (providing sufficient contribution).